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Abstract
Communications policymaking increasingly relies upon large-scale databases manufactured and marketed
by commercial organizations. Data providers such as BIA Research, Nielsen Media Research, and
Arbitron play a vitally important role in aggregating the data that policymakers, policy analysts, and
policy advocates rely upon in policy deliberations. In many ways, these data providers supplement the
limited data gathering capacity of government bodies such as the FCC and NTIA and thereby help to
bring a greater quantity of relevant data to bear on policy issues than would otherwise be possible.
Indeed, these data are utilized extensively by stakeholders with an interest in policy outcomes to conduct
and submit studies that policymakers rely upon in their deliberations (often in lieu of conducting such
research on their own).
One unfortunate byproduct of this situation, however, is that, to the increasing extent that the data relied
upon in policymaking, policy analysis, and policy advocacy are provided by commercial organizations,
substantial inequalities in access to these data inevitably arise. Specifically, significant actors in the
policymaking process, such as academic researchers and public interest organizations, lack the financial
resources of communications firms and industry associations to gain access to the data that are vital to
conducting thorough, reliable, and persuasive policy research. Policymakers themselves often find their
research objectives inhibited by the enormous expense associated with the relevant large-scale
commercial datasets, and thus find themselves increasingly reliant upon the analyses conducted by those
stakeholder groups with the resources necessary to gain access to such data. As a result of these
information asymmetries, policy decision-making is likely to suffer, as the research inputs inevitably fail
to reflect the full range of considerations across the full range of interested stakeholders. This paper
illustrates these issues via a case study of the FCC’s 2003 media ownership proceeding and offers
suggestions for how the existing disparities in access to policy-relevant data might be addressed.
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Necessary knowledge for communications policy: Information inequalities and commercial data
access and usage in the policymaking process

Introduction
The communications policymaking process is becoming increasingly research-driven.1 As has
been seen across all policy sectors, policymakers increasingly rely upon both internally- and externallygenerated empirical studies in the formulation of, and justification for, specific policy decisions.2 This
has proven to be a controversial trend, both within and beyond communications policymaking, as debates
have arisen about the appropriate role, usage, and capabilities of empirical research in policymaking.3
Regardless of these disputes, it is safe to say that both the demand for – and utilization of – research have
become more pronounced in communications policymaking. Consequently, stakeholders seeking to have
an impact on policy outcomes find themselves increasingly reliant upon research to effectively support
their policy arguments.4
One aspect of this trend that has been neglected, however, involves the increased importance of
data generated by large-scale commercial data providers to policymaking and policy analysis. That is,
market, audience, and content data gathered and aggregated by commercial organizations such as Nielsen
Media Research,5 BIA Research,6 Arbitron,7 and Kagan Research8 play an increasingly prominent role in

1

See Philip M. Napoli, The Broadening of the Media Policy Research Agenda. White Paper, Social Science
Research Council, 4-8, available at http://www.ssrc.org/programs/media/publications/PhilipNapoli.1.Final.doc. (last
visited June 6, 2006) (arguing that the media policy research agenda is broadening beyond economic/technological
issues to account for political and cultural issues as well).
2
See infra notes 12-60 and accompanying text.
3
See infra notes 23-26 and 46-50 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
5
Nielsen Media Research is the primary provider of national and local television audience ratings in the United
States and in many other countries around the world. Clients include broadcast and cable networks, advertisers, local
stations and cable systems. Nielsen also provides Internet audience data through its Nielsen NetRatings affiliates.
See website at http://www.nielsenmediaresearch.com (last accessed June 6, 2006).
6
BIA Research provides financial, ownership, and market data for the broadcast television, radio and newspaper
industries in the U.S. Clients include financial institutions, investors, and media organizations. See website at
http://www.bia.com (last accessed June 6, 2006).
7
Arbitron is the primary provider of national and local radio audience ratings in the United States. Clients include
radio stations, networks, and advertisers. See website at http://www.arbitron.com (last accessed June 6, 2006).
8
Kagan Research provides financial data, industry forecasts, and sector-specific newsletters for the cable, broadcast
television, wireless, and motion picture industries. Clients include financial institutions, investors, and media
organizations. See website at http://www.kagan.com (last accessed June 6, 2006).
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the research submitted to – and conducted by – the FCC. These data providers often are the sole source
of specific information that is central to developing portraits of media markets, audience behavior, or
content availability,9 and are at the core policy decision-making, policy analysis, and policy advocacy.
However, these data sources also are often enormously expensive and are thus difficult to access. And, in
some instances, the access terms can be very prohibitive – in ways that can undermine the effective
dissemination of the research.
This paper considers the implications of the prominence of commercial data in the
communications policymaking process. Specifically, this paper considers the kinds of imbalances in
policy advocacy and policy decision-making that may be created by unequal access to these important
data sources by the various stakeholders involved in the policymaking process. Drawing upon theoretical
and empirical work related to information asymmetries and knowledge utilization, this paper argues that
the contemporary communications policymaking environment is one in which the disparity in resources
across various stakeholder groups is amplified by the associated imbalances in access to the commercial
data sources that are increasingly central to policy decision-making and to persuasive policy advocacy.
This paper therefore proposes a number of solutions to correct this imbalance and thereby reduce the
information asymmetries that characterize contemporary communications policy analysis and policy
advocacy.
The first section of this paper provides background on the policymaking process and the role of
research in this process, drawing upon the growing body of literature focusing on knowledge utilization in
policymaking. This section documents the increasingly empirical orientation that has characterized
policymaking as a whole and communications policymaking in particular. This section also documents
the increased importance of external policy analysts (i.e., scholars, advocates, industry associations, think

9

For an analysis of the economics of ratings firms, see Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Robert W. Hahn, and Anne LayneFarrar, Regulating the Raters: The Law and Economics of Ratings Firms 2 (2006) AEI-Brookings Join Center for
Regulatory Studies Working Paper 06-02 (on file with author) (“most ratings firms operate in highly concentrated
markets”).
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tanks) and their research to policy decision-making. This section then situates these trends within the
concept of information asymmetries and their impact on policy decision-making.
The second section explores the privatization of the data that feeds into contemporary policy
analysis. This section documents trends across policymaking and database construction in general, as
well as within the specific context of communications policymaking. This section includes a case study
of the FCC’s 2003 media ownership decision10 in order to illustrate the prominence that commercial data
sources can play in communications policymaking and policy analysis, as well as the complications that
can arise from this reliance upon such sources. This section documents the range of commercial data
sources used both by the FCC and by those filing comments/analyses cited by the Commission in
connection with its June, 2003 Report and Order.11
The third section considers the normative arguments in favor of granting broader access to data
sources to policy researchers. This section outlines the social benefits associated with expanded data
access, as well as the dangers and costs associated with a policymaking environment in which substantial
data access disparities exist.
The fourth section offers a set of recommendations for developing expanded data access for
policy researchers. This section explores possible mechanisms for enhancing the role of the government
in data gathering, as well as mechanisms for developing greater access to commercial data sources for
policy researchers in ways that balance the financial imperatives of commercial data providers (whose
adequate financial incentives are essential to the continued generation of these data sources) with the
public interest considerations regarding the effective operation of the policymaking process. The
concluding section summarizes the key arguments presented in this paper and offers suggestions for
further research.
Research and Policymaking

10

Federal Communications Commission, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620 (2003).
11
Id.
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Regulatory decision-making inevitably involves the blending of empirical findings with
normative judgments.12 This, however, is a challenging balance to strike,13 and one that requires an
integration of value judgments and logical calculations.14 Nonetheless, many observers of the
policymaking process have identified a continued trend toward a greater reliance upon empirical research,
as part of a greater “rationalization” of policy decision-making.15 Albaek describes the introduction of
evaluation and policy research into U.S. policymaking in the 1960s and 1970s as “one of the most
comprehensive attempts so far to allow research to make its original, relevant contribution to changing
society for the better.”16
There have been a number of explanations for this development. Some argue that it is a purely
needs-driven phenomenon. As the National Research Council has noted, “As the economy grows more
complex and the population becomes more diverse, increasingly detailed data and data analyses are
required for policies to match well with economic and demographic realities. This is true not only for
policy making, but also for policy assessment and evaluation.”17 Others take a more critical stance,
seeing this trend as a mechanism for marginalizing the citizenry in the policymaking process as well as

12

Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental Decisionmaking. 78 TEMP. L. REV. 659, 666
(2005). See also Paul Sabatier, The Acquisition and Utilization of Technical Information by Administrative
Agencies, 23 ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY 396, 397 (1978) (“No policy decision can be based solely on technical
information. Normative elements invariably enter, whether the value choices come from the statute, the personal
philosophies of administrative officials, or their efforts to balance the preferences of competing constitutiencies”).
13
GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, EVIDENCE, ARGUMENTS, AND PERSUASION IN THE POLICY PROCESS, 5 (1989) (“how can
one separate the scientific from the political and value components of policy issues that encompass both?”).
14
Id. (“Since to say anything of importance in public policy requires value judgments . . . artificial separation
between values and rational capacities is a threat to all notions of public deliberation and defensible policy choices. .
. . facts and values are . . . intertwined in policy-making”).
15
DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING, 7 (2002) (describing the
“rationality project” that she sees “at the core of American political culture since the beginning”). See also BRUCE
BIMBER, THE POLITCS OF EXPERTISE IN CONGRESS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, xi (1996) (noting that “the possibility of isolating objective truths from human values, and the ability
to capture what is most important about public life with science, shapes both experts’ attempts to inform policymaking and scholars’ struggles to define methodology for understanding political action”); Kurt Finsterbusch &
Mary R. Hamilton, The Rationalization of Social Science Research in Policy Studies. 19 INT’L. J. OF COMP.
SOCIOLOGY 58 (1978) (“Social scientists are becoming increasingly involved in policy research”). See generally,
Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy (1991).
16
Erik Albaek, Between Knowledge and Power: Utilization of Social Science in Public Policymaking. 28 POLICY
SCIENCES 79, 81 (1995).
17
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EXPANDING ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA: RECONCILING RISKS AND
OPPORTUNITIES, 17, (2005).
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marginalizing the role of value judgments in policy decision-making.18 Regardless of the reason, this
trend certainly can be described as a self-sustaining process, one in which the initial influx of empiricallyminded personnel into policymaking bodies creates internal motivations for empirical analysis, which in
turn furthers the staffing of these bodies with similarly-oriented personnel.19
These broad trends certainly characterize communications policymaking, where a stronger
emphasis on research-driven policymaking developed within the Federal Communications Commission in
the 1970s and 1980s,20 and the personnel make-up of the FCC shifted accordingly.21 In 1973, the
Commission introduced its own internal research and planning enterprise, the Office of Plans and Policy,
so that the agency would be better equipped with the data and analyses it deemed necessary to guide its
decision-making.22
A common concern raised about this trend, however, involves the extent to which it represent
legitimate efforts to bring greater objectivity and analysis to policy decision-making; or, rather, that
research and analysis have been primarily utilized in support of pre-determined policy outcomes. From
this latter perspective “research is used as ‘political ammunition,’”23 serving a “legitimation” function in
the realms of policymaking and policy advocacy.24 Sabatier summarizes this position well when he notes

18

See, e.g., PETER DELEON, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICY SCIENCES (1997); D. Torgerson, Between Knowledge
and Politics: Three Faces of Policy Analysis. 19 POLICY SCIENCES 33 (1986).
19
Sabatier, supra note 12 (“employees who are scientists or members of a profession with a tradition of empirical
research also create significant internal pressures for technical analysis because of their training, their desire for
esteem from their professional peers, and the enjoyment and sense of personal competence such research provides”).
20
As was characteristic across policymaking sectors, economics was the primary discipline around which this
greater empirical orientation in policymaking was organized. See ROBERT CORN-REVERE, ECONOMICS AND MEDIA
REGULATION. IN MEDIA ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 71, 83 (1993) (describing the FCC’s move away from
an “intuitive model” of policymaking and the agency’s “newly discovered interest in the collection of economic data
and analysis”). See Philip M. Napoli, The Unique Nature of Communications Regulation: Evidence and
Implications for Communications Policy Analysis. 43 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 656 (1999), for a
discussion of the implications of this trend for communication policymaking
21
WENMOUTH W. WILLIAMS, JR., THE IMPACT OF COMMISSIONER BACKGROUND ON FCC DECISIONS. IN MEDIA AND
PUBLIC POLICY, 43 (M. Spitzer, Ed., 1993).
22
See Philip M. Napoli, Government Assessment of FCC Performance: Recurring Patterns and Implications for
Recent Reform Efforts. 22 TELECOM. POLICY 409, 417 (1998). The Office of Plans and Policy was renamed the
Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis in 2003, at which point it was both expanded and restructured. See
Federal Communications Commission, Name Change of the Office of Plans and Policy, at
http//hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231048A1.pdf (March 5, 2003).
23
See Albaek, supra note 16 at 85.
24
James M. Rogers, Surrendering the Ideal of Disinterestedness in the Policy Research Process: A Cautionary
Note. 2 KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY 6, 12 (1989).
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that “it is quite likely that administrative agencies devote a considerable portion of their resources to the
acquisition of technical information but that this information is often utilized to legitimate, rather than to
influence, policy decisions.”25 The credibility of the research inevitably gets called into question from
this standpoint, as policymakers who are not, in fact, seeking decision-making guidance from empirical
research, but rather are seeking studies that support specific pre-determined policy outcomes, may not
engage in appropriate scrutiny in either the commissioning or the assessment of individual pieces of
research.26
However, others argue that this kind of political utilization of research and analysis is perfectly in
keeping with principles of democratic deliberation, and that the notion of a truly objective and rational
policymaking process is an ideal type that never has, and never will, characterize the realities of
policymaking.27 Rather, policy analysis is better considered as a form of argument.28 According to
Rogers, “It seems that the policy research community is gradually coming to accept the politicization of
knowledge utilization.”29 As a result, policy researchers have become more comfortable with politicized
uses of their work and even more willing to consciously and directly employ their research expertise in
more overtly political manners.30 Similarly, analysts of the policymaking process have come to

25

Sabatier, supra note 12, at 396.
Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in Public Health
and Environmental Regulation. 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 79 (2003) (“Agencies might have numerous reasons
to rely on weak or valueless studies to support regulations. For example, either low-level staff or micro-managing,
high-level administrators with political objectives might have both incentive and opportunity to commission or
combine studies that lead to a predetermined result. Malaise and inattention might also cause agency staff to include
in their analyses studies that are not sufficiently scrutinized”).
27
MAJONE, supra note 13, at 12-20, (discussing “decisionism”: the model of a completely rational and objective
approach to policy analysis that fails to provide a “realistic view of the uses of knowledge and analysis in policy
deliberation”). See also Randall L. Calvert, The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political
Advice. 47 J. OF POLITICS 530, 531 (1985) (presenting a theoretical model illustrating the value and utility of biased
information and selectively consulting information sources according to particular biases for policymakers).
28
MAJONE, supra note 13, at 7. (“The job of analysts consist in large part of producing evidence and arguments to
be used in the course of public debate. . . . The arguments analysts produce may be more or less technical, more or
less sophisticated, but they must persuade if they are to be taken seriously in the forums of public deliberation”).
29
Rogers, supra note 24.
30
Id. at 8 (1989) (characterizing uses of analysis as “strategic behavioral responses” in the policymaking and policy
advocacy processes).
26
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understand that politics and analysis can not be completely divorced.31 The key, however, is that both
rational and political approaches to the policymaking process involve substantial reliance upon research
and analysis, albeit for different purposes.32
Not surprisingly, to the extent that there has developed a strong impetus for tighter linkages
between research and policymaking,33 there also has developed a substantial body of literature examining
if and how research is, in fact being used.34 While the conclusions within this body of literature are wideranging, most relevant to this study are the findings that research can impact policymaking in a variety of
ways, and that this impact can be both direct and indirect.35 Indeed, one of the greatest challenges in the
field of knowledge utilization research involves effectively capturing the variety of ways in which the use
of a particular piece of research might take place.36 In some (perhaps rare) instances, the relationship
between research and decision-outcome may be very direct, with a particular study directly influencing a
specific policy decision. In other instances, utilization of research may take place at a more abstract level,
impacting which issues policymakers choose to focus their attention on, or perhaps influencing how a
31

Bob L. Johnson, Jr., The Politics of Research-Information Use in the Education Policy Arena. 13 EDUCATIONAL
POLICY 23, 25 (1999) (“In short, post-Great Society policy frameworks reflect an increased sensitivity to the
political nature and use of research information in the policy-making process”).
32
See MAJONE, supra note 13 at 33 (“it is wrong to assume that the only legitimate use of analysis is to assist the
policymaker in discovering a solution to a problem. Policymakers need retrospective (postdecision) analysis as least
as much as they need prospective (or predecision) analysis, and probably more. . . As long as rationality is defined
as choosing the best means to a given end, it is natural to consider retrospective justificatory arguments as being
outside the pale of professional analysis – ‘mere rhetoric,’ propaganda, or rationalization. However, this
instrumental view is not an adequate characterization of the role of reason in human affairs”).
33
See Daniel Breslau, The Political Power of Research Methods: Knowledge Regimes in U.S. Labor-Market Policy.
26 THEORY & SOCIETY 869 (1997), for an example of the frequent calls for stronger linkages between research and
policymaking, (“social science research rarely has a discernible effect on policy decisions” at 870); See also Jan
Hutjes, Policy Research: Between the Accumulation and Implementation of Knowledge. 4 KNOWLEDGE & POLICY
10 (1991); James M. Rogers, Social Science Disciplines and Policy Research: The Case of Political Science. 9
POLICY STUDIES REVIEW 13 (1989). For examples that focus specifically on the communications policy context, see
Philip M. Napoli and Nancy Gillis, Reassessing the Potential Contribution of Communications Research to
Communications Policy: The Case of Media Ownership (in press) J. OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA xx
(2006); Napoli, supra note 20; STEVEN S. WILDMAN, TOWARD A BETTER INTEGRATION OF MEDIA ECONOMICS AND
MEDIA COMPETITION POLICY. IN A COMMUNICATIONS CORNUCOPIA 573 (1998).
34
See, e.g., Albaek, supra note 16; Janice M. Beyer & Harrison M. Trice, The Utilization Process: A Conceptual
Framework and Synthesis of Empirical Findings,. 27 ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY 591 (1982); Rejean Landry, Moktar
Lamari, & Nabil Amara, The Extent and Determinants of Utilization of University Research in Government
Agencies. 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 192 (2003); Cheol H. Oh & Robert F. Rich, Explaining Use of Information in
Public Policymaking. 9 KNOWLEDGE & POLICY 3 (1996); Sabatier, supra note 12.
35
David J. Webber, The Distribution and Use of Policy Knowledge in the Policy Process. 4 KNOWLEDGE & POLICY
6 (1991), for a detailed discussion of the various uses of research in the policymaking process.
36
See Landry, Lamari, & Amara, supra note 34 at 202.
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particular policy issue is framed.37 There may be a variety of stages in the decision-making process in
which research may have an impact.38 Indeed, when a somewhat broader notion of the “use” of research
is employed, the apparent role of research in the policymaking process increases considerably.39
Thus, as this review is meant to suggest, regardless of how research is used (or misused) in the
policymaking process, its potential for influence has grown.40 As a result, those interested in the extent to
which the mechanisms of the policymaking process reflect and serve the full range of relevant policy
considerations need to consider the dynamics surrounding the generation of policy-relevant research.
External Stakeholders and Policy Research
One key element of these dynamics involves the extent to which external stakeholders are serving
an increasingly important research function in the policymaking process. Many observers of the
policymaking process suggest that the role of external analysts and researchers is becoming more
prominent and more influential.41 There are normative reasons for this kind of outsourcing of the
analytical work that informs policymaking. According to the National Research Council, because the
scope of research by governmental agencies is often narrowly focused, “data access by other researchers
is necessary to ensure that alternative methodologies and uses are fully explored to advance social science
knowledge and the design and evaluation of public policies.”42 The separation between researchers and

37

See, e.g., Carol H. Weiss, Research for Policy’s Sake: The Enlightenment Function of Social Research. 3 POLICY
ANALYSIS 531, 533-34 (1977) (“The major use of social research in public policymaking may not be problem
solving . . .. Research use appears to be a much more diffuse and circuitous process. Evidence suggests that
government officials use research less to arrive at solutions than to orient themselves to problems. They use
research to help them think about issues and define the problematics of a situation, to gain new ideas and new
perspectives. They use research to help formulate problems and to set the agenda for future policy actions. And
much of this use is not deliberate, direct, and targeted, but a result of long-term percolation of social science
concepts, theories, and findings into the climate of informed opinion”). Weiss labels this phenomenon the
“enlightenment model of research.”
38
See Landry, Lamari, & Amara, supra note 34 at 194. The authors identify six stages of knowledge utilization:
Reception; cognition, discussion, reference, effort, and influence, each ultimately reflecting different ways that
research can be incorporated into the policymaking process.
39
Id. at 202 (discussing when employing multiple stages of knowledge utilization into the research design, “findings
suggest that university research is used more extensively than is commonly assumed”).
40
See Oh & Rich, supra note 34 at 3 (“Whether policy processes are perceived as political or scientific activities,
decision makers often face the necessity of using information in making complicated and dynamic decisions”).
41
See Bimber, supra note 15 at 1 (“The numbers of these external experts [performing policy analysis] have
increased dramatically in recent decades . . . forming what has been called the ‘fifth branch’ of government”).
42
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17 at 38.
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policymakers is further explored by Weiss, who notes that “Researchers are not expected to participate as
decision makers. In the public policy sphere, their task has generally been to illuminate the consequences
of alternatives in order that people in positions of authority can know what they will get and what they
will give up when they select a particular course.”43 Academic researchers often are identified as playing
a particularly important role in this process, serving as the “second community” in the knowledge
utilization process that provides research to policy decision-makers (the “first community”).44 Within the
context of communications policymaking, Bauer, et al. found that while some research and ideas are
generated within policy-making institutions, “most originates from outside and needs to be introduced to
policy-making and further processed by policy-makers.”45 Findings such as these highlight the
importance of maintaining both the quantity and quality of external research, as policymakers are
becoming increasingly dependent upon this research in the formulation of their policy priorities and in
their choice of policy solutions.
There are, of course, dangers inherent in such a system as well. Perhaps the most obvious, and
most compelling, involves the possibility of biased analyses being injected into the policy process by
stakeholders with a vested interest in a specific outcome. Such concerns become particularly acute in
light of frequent observations that such external analyses do not necessarily receive sufficient scrutiny
before they are used in policy formation.46 Indeed, numerous criticisms have been leveled over the years

43

Carl H. Weiss, Policy Research as Advocacy: Pro and Con. 4 KNOWLEDGE & POLICY 37, 38 (1991).
See DANIEL COHN, JUMPING INTO THE POLITICAL FRAY: ACADEMICS AND POLICY-MAKING. INSTITUTE FOR
RESEARCH ON PUBLIC POLICY, 3 (2006).
45
Johannes M. Bauer, Sungjoong Kim, Steven S. Wildman, and Bella Mody, Making U.S. Telecommunications
Policy: Who Participates and Who is Heard? The Role of Research and Ideas. White Paper, Quello Center,
Michigan State University, 8 (2006), for further analysis of how stakeholders influence communications
policymaking. See John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, The Structure and Conduct of Corporate
Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission, 10 J. OF ECON. & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
91 (2001).
46
Linda R. Cohen & Robert W. Hahn, Science and Regulation: A Solution to Concerns Over Public Access to
Scientific Data, 285 SCIENCE 535 (1999) (“At present, analyses used in policy-making are rarely checked carefully
before big regulations are put in place”). See also Wagner, supra note 26 at 67 (“Problems with the quality of
science underlying regulations arise if an agency weights these low-quality studies too heavily or ignores or gives
insufficient credence to high quality research”).
44
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against the use of “junk science” in policy decision-making.47 Wagner and Michaels argue that policy
concerns over the objectivity and quality of scientific research used in policymaking have misguidedly
emphasized publicly financed research, to the neglect of external, privately funded and conducted
research.48 They document the various mechanisms that frequently are employed by private stakeholders
to intentionally bias the privately-funded research that frequently is injected into – and relied upon in –
the policymaking process, such that private research appears to be far more suspect than the publiclyfunded research that has been the focus of regulatory attention.49 The authors therefore recommend that
the exact same regulatory oversight mechanisms that currently are applied to publicly funded research be
applied to privately funded research.50
What has been described, then, is a somewhat paradoxical situation: one in which policymakers
increasingly rely upon research in their work, but at the same time are ceding more of this research
function to external stakeholders. In a policymaking environment that is increasingly research-driven,
and in which outside stakeholders are expected to make the bulk of the substantial analytical contributions
to the policymaking process, any stakeholder group’s ability to effectively advocate for specific policy
outcomes is becoming increasingly tied to that group’s ability to conduct or commission relevant
research. The mindset of policymakers is often heavily weighted in favor of arguments based upon
empirical data. As has been noted within the context of environmental regulation, “comments not framed
as ‘scientific input’ often remain ignored.”51 This is often equally true in communications policy
contexts. In 2003, then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell noted, in response to an overwhelming tide of
47

Wagner, supra note 26, at 79, (“Agencies might have numerous reasons to rely on weak or valueless studies to
support regulations. For example, either low-level staff or micro-managing, high-level administrators with political
objectives might have both incentive and opportunity to commission or combine studies that lead to a predetermined
result. Malaise and inattention might also cause agency staff to include in their analyses studies that are not
sufficiently scrutinized”).
48
Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the Controls Governing
the Quality of Public Research to Private Research. 30 AM. J. OF LAW & MEDICINE 119, 120 (2004) (“to the extent
that there is a problem with regulatory science . . . the ‘sound science’ reforms miss the target by taking aim at
public, rather than private, science”).
49
Id. at 122-128 (describing tactics such as the falsification of data and research findings, ends-oriented biases in
research design and reporting, and the suppression of adverse results).
50
Id. at 148 (“we recommend that whatever oversight is given to public research (and the appropriate level is
certainly open to question) should also be applied to private research”).
51
See Tai, supra, note 12 at 666.
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public comment against the relaxation of the FCC’s media ownership rules,52 that such comments should
not be considered as evidence as, according to Powell, “they tend to be at a very generalized level.”53
Information Asymmetries and Policy Research
It is within these dynamics that concerns about information asymmetries derived from inequitable
data access arise. A number of researchers across a variety of disciplines have explored the concept of
information asymmetries in relation to the policymaking process.54 In some instances, the role of research
has been a focal point for such analyses. Tai, for instance, in an analysis of environmental regulation,
identifies asymmetries in participants’ abilities to proffer information to agencies and to process and
understand information they receive from agencies as a key factor that can lead to “interest-group
domination by parties better able to generate, receive, and process information.”55
The institutional dynamics of the policymaking process in many ways inherently favor large,
well-resourced commercial interests over those of citizens or public interest advocates. As Tai notes
(again, within the context of environmental regulation), “the complexities of participation may require
significant resources to generate substantive public comments . . . ”56 A key element of “substantive”
public comments increasingly involves empirical research. Meaningful participation in the policymaking
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process therefore often requires the generation, or commissioning, of social science-based studies. Of
course, “Well-funded and organized entities, such as industries . . . can more easily afford to generate
these studies than the lay public,”57 or, for that matter, the public interest organizations that often serve as
surrogates for the public in many policy debates, or the scholarly community. Ultimately, “There is little
doubt that unequal resources produces an imbalanced pool of analytic input.”58 Such imbalances likely
impact the integrity of the policymaking process whether the process as conceptualized as a primarily
scientific or primarily political process,59 to the extent that the policy arguments of some stakeholders
(those with research to support their arguments) likely receive substantially greater consideration by
policymakers than the policy arguments of other stakeholders (those without supporting research).60
Privatization of Data
What has been described thus far, then, is a policymaking environment in which empirical
research is increasingly influential in the policymaking process, in which a large portion of that research
responsibility has been ceded to external stakeholders, and in which the resource differences between
these stakeholder groups are substantial – all of which suggests a policy process that is highly unbalanced,
purely from a research-generating capacity, in favor of certain stakeholder groups. The purpose of this
section is to illustrate how such imbalances may be compounded by another defining characteristic of the
contemporary policymaking/policy analysis landscape (particularly in relation to communications policy)
57
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– the increased privatization and commercialization of the core data necessary for rigorous policy
analyses.
Embedded within the broader trend of the privatization of many aspects of governmental
authority61 is the more specific issue of the privatization of the data gathering mechanisms that feed into
policy decision-making. Across a variety of fields, there has been a trend towards the commodification of
data and information that previously was treated as a public good.62 A recent Washington Post article
illustrated the extent to which national security policymaking is becoming increasingly reliant upon data
obtained from private vendors.63 Greenbaum details the decreasing role that the U.S. government has
played in the generation of databases over the past thirty years, noting that in 1977 government-sponsored
databases accounted for 56% of the American market, but that by 2002 this number had fallen to 6%.64
Reasons for this phenomenon are both economic and political, with rising database production costs
coupled with mounting governmental costs in other areas accounting for the economic pressure; and
lobbying from industry groups eager to fill – and profit from – the voids left when government agencies
withdraw from data collection accounting for the political pressure.65 It is worth noting, however, that
“This significant loss of government capital in the industry still paralleled a phenomenal increase in
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growth of the industry, indicating that the degree of private investment has more than made up for the
government’s pullback.”66 The financial incentives for government agencies to move out of the data
collection enterprise can, of course, be substantial, as funds can be freed up for other activities.67 The
danger that arises, however, involves how the terms of access available to other users of the data change
as the data move from public to private hands.68
As these data move to private hands, researchers increasingly find themselves at the mercy of the
often prohibitive pricing platforms and often very restrictive licensing conditions of the commercial data
providers. 69 And there are, at this point, no regulations or policies directed at specifying access
parameters or price ceilings that commercial data providers must abide by when their data are sought for
policy-relevant research. As Reichman and Uhlir argue, “The lack of any restraints on licensing,
especially on sole-source data providers, adds to the dangers inherent in the creation of a strong exclusive
property right in collections of data. . . . Without a concomitant duty to deal fairly and reasonably with
public-interest users, these combined powers could lead to high prices for data and to the imposition of
harsh and oppressive terms concerning both access and subsequent uses of data that would especially
disadvantage academic researchers.”70 The ultimate danger of such scenario, of course, is a “chilling
effect on data-intensive research.”71
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Recently, we have seen efforts to enhance the control that database providers have over the usage
of the information they provide. For instance, the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act72 was an
effort that, had it passed, would have prevented an individual from extracting, or using in commerce, a
substantial portion of the information contained in a database compiled by another party, even if the
information contained within the database was factual in nature (facts generally not being copyrightable),
so as to harm the actual or potential market for the product.73 Although the Act included language that
granted permission to individuals to extract data for nonprofit, educational, scientific, or research
purposes in a manner that did not harm directly the actual or potential market for the product, Pollack
points out the glaring loophole in such apparently permissive language: “Scientific databases are used
largely by scientists and educators. A scientist who uses a scientific database for free is, therefore,
hurting the database’s market.”74 Similarly, Reichman and Uhlir warn that “Especially serious problems
seem likely to arise when the public research community becomes the target market for the commercial
data supplier, and there is a resulting tension between freedom of contract and the needs and capabilities
of the nonprofit research sector. In principle, one expects that a supplier will not price itself out of the
market. In practice, some science publishers have adopted exorbitant pricing strategies that do limit
scientists’ abilities to access and use their products.”75 Consequently, those under-resourced providers of
external policy analysis (scholars, public interest/advocacy organizations) find themselves at a
tremendous disadvantage in terms of their ability to provide relevant information and analysis to
policymakers. And policymakers – and their decision-making – then suffer as well.
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Concerns such as these do, of course, need to be weighed against the economic imperatives
facing commercial data providers. The collection and aggregation of the type of data used in
policymaking are incredibly expensive. And, to the extent that this sector has become privatized,
sufficient financial incentives need to be in place to encourage the continued creation of such databases,
absent a return to greater government involvement in the collection and dissemination of policy-relevant
data.76 Ultimately, then, the somewhat paradoxical situation is one in which “Although society has a
strong interest in encouraging the creation of valuable databases, society also has an opposing interest in
open access to the factual information comprising the databases. Therefore, society’s grant of protection
to database compilers attempts to strike a balance between the rights of the database producers to profit
from their own labor and society’s interest in access to the information.”77 According to many analyses,
the balance may currently be tilted in favor of the commercial database vendors.78
This trend towards the privatization of policy-relevant data, and the tensions between the interests
of the data providers and the interests of the policy analysis communities, have been particularly
pronounced in the area of communications policy. The deregulatory trend of the past 30 years has been
characterized in communications policy by a continued withdrawing by the FCC from gathering various
forms of standardized data from the organizations under its regulatory authority.79 Thus, for instance,
broadcast license renewal requests, which once required the submission of a substantial amount of
information regarding licensee performance, now take the form of a simple “postcard renewal,” in which
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little, if any, substantive information is gathered from the licensee.80 The Commission used to gather
detailed employment data in connection with its Equal Employment Opportunity rules, but the scaling
back of these rules has been accompanied by a scaling back of the quantity and quality of the employment
data the Commission gathers.81 The Commission used to gather cable system subscriber data, but stopped
gathering such data after an initiative to deregulate the cable industry was implemented in the 1990s.82
An earlier deregulatory period led the FCC to cease gathering financial statements from broadcasters.83
Access to such data must now be obtained from a growing array of commercial data providers.
Industry financial and ownership information, for example, is now provided primarily by an organization
called BIA Research,84 which aggregates television, radio station, and newspaper revenue, market,
ownership, and ratings/circulation data into a large, comprehensive database that even the FCC relies
upon heavily for its own analyses.85 Similar information for the cable industry, which the FCC used to
obtain regularly, now is gathered and supplied primarily by Kagan Research.86 Today, in order to obtain
the kind of information about television station programming practices that used to be gathered by the
FCC in its license renewal process, researchers must consult television program schedule databases
supplied commercially by organizations such as Tribune Media Services.87 Reflecting these trends, a
report by the Center for Public Integrity noted that its efforts to construct a database of media companies
was repeatedly hampered by the lack of relevant publicly available data, and that very little of the relevant
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data resided with the FCC.88 These examples support Media Access Project’s Harold Feld’s observation
that “Self-generated and self-directed research . . . accounts for a vanishingly small amount of FCC
data.”89
There are, of course, other data sources, such as the audience ratings data provided by firms such
as Nielsen (for television)90 and Arbitron (for radio)91 that traditionally have been commercially
generated. These data sources, too, are becoming increasingly central to contemporary communications
policy analysis,92 particularly in light of the trend toward economically-oriented analyses described
above, as well as the recent trend toward better integrating analyses of audience behavior and media
usage into the policy decision-making process.93 And thus, while the government has never been
involved in the creation of such data, such data are becoming increasingly important in the analyses that
policymakers conduct and rely upon.94
Obtaining the relevant data from the private sector can often prove difficult, with price being the
primary impediment. One might argue that since databases are public goods,95 the sellers of these
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databases would be willing and able to make the data available to under-resourced groups (such as
scholars or public interest/advocacy organizations) at a dramatically reduced price.96 In reality, these data
providers often do just that, though these dramatically reduced prices often can still be substantial by
scholarly and/or non-profit standards. Also related to this issue is the dynamics of the subsidization of
data access. That is, most communications-related commercial databases are funded primarily by clients
from within these industries.97 Should these database providers then make their data available to the
scholarly and/or public interest/advocacy communities at a dramatically reduced rate, these providers are
vulnerable to criticism from their primary constituency. Specifically, the database provider’s major client
list may take issue with their substantial subscription payments being used to essentially help subsidize
much less expensive data access for other constituencies – constituencies that ultimately may use the data
to produce research highly critical of these very same communications firms.98 Thus, there are more than
basic pricing issues to be navigated by commercial database providers who produce information relevant
to communications policymaking and policy advocacy.
In sum, the concurrent trends of the increased need for robust empirical analysis in order to
meaningfully participate in the policy process and the increased privatization of much of the data
necessary for such analyses, create a situation in which the resource imbalances that characterize the
stakeholder dynamics in the policymaking process can become magnified and contribute to even greater
imbalances in terms of the analyses that different stakeholder groups are able to bring to bear on
individual policy issues.
Case Study: Media Ownership
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As has been argued, the situation in communications policy regarding the centrality of privately
generated databases to effective policy analysis is particularly pronounced. Commercial databases
ranging from television and radio audience ratings, to industry financial information, to newspaper
circulation figures, provide the bases for the kinds of analyses that are at the core of many
communications policy decisions. This section illustrates this point via a case study of the FCC’s highly
publicized, and highly controversial, media ownership proceeding.99 In this proceeding, the FCC voted to
relax a number of restrictions on the common ownership of media outlets.100
This proceeding also was characterized by the relatively rare phenomenon in which the FCC
commissioned twelve empirical studies in advance of its June, 2003 decision, which were conducted both
by internal staff members and by outside scholars and commercial organizations.101 This proceeding is
also particularly illustrative in light of the controversies that arose in the wake of the Commission’s
release of these twelve studies. Specifically, the issue of commercial, proprietary data and the appropriate
level of access that should be provided to such data in policymaking contexts came to the forefront of the
media ownership proceeding. In October of 2002, the FCC released its twelve studies addressing various
dimensions of the media ownership issue.102 These studies were part of what FCC Chairman Michael
Powell declared “the most comprehensive look at media ownership ever untaken by the FCC,”103 and
ultimately figured prominently in the Commission’s eventual decision on the media ownership
proceeding.104 When external stakeholders such as scholars and public interest advocates sought to verify
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the claims of these studies via reanalysis of their underlying data, their requests were initially denied.105
Under substantial pressure,106 the FCC eventually relented, though only marginally. Date for eight of the
twelve studies were made available on-line in November of 2002107 Also in November of 2002, the
Commission released a Protective Order108 that granted limited access to the underlying data for the
remaining four studies under highly restricted terms. These limitations on access were enforced due to
the proprietary nature of the commercial data underlying these four studies.109 Those seeking to review
the data for these four studies were required to sign a Declaration promising to abide by the terms of the
Protective Order. Access to the data would be limited to on-site access at FCC headquarters.110 No
removal or copying of the data were permitted,111 though reviewing parties were permitted to conduct
their own analyses with the data.112 Of course, conducting such analyses on-site, under the time
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limitations imposed on access to the data would prove quite difficult; and thus, this arrangement hardly
represents an ideal solution to the issue of access to the commercial data used in policy decision-making.
It is worth noting that the Commission did offer, as an alternative, that “Outside parties also may obtain
licenses from any or all licensors of the underlying data to evaluate the results of the studies and/or
develop other studies that will contribute to the record in the proceeding.”113
Given these circumstances, the media ownership proceeding probably can not be considered
representative of the role that commercial data play in communications policymaking. Rather, it
represents an extreme scenario that illustrates the degree to which commercial data sources can factor into
the communications policymaking process. To illustrate this extreme, the media ownership Report and
Order was analyzed as follows. First, all references in the Report and Order were analyzed to determine
whether they referenced a specific study. Referenced studies submitted to the FCC as part of formal
comments filed with the Commission, as well as studies (published or unpublished) referenced directly by
the FCC were included in the analysis. Next, these studies were obtained, and their methodologies
analyzed, to determine which, if any, commercial data sources were utilized in the analysis. Studies
submitted as part of formal comments were obtained via retrieval of the comments through the Electronic
Comments Filing System (ECFS) available on the FCC’s home page.114 Finally, all of the references in
the Report and Order also were analyzed to determine which, if any, commercial data sources (such as
industry statistical sources, or ratings reports), were referenced by the FCC directly in the Report and
Order, independent of their use in any particular study. These efforts were undertaken simply to provide
a thorough catalog of the range of commercial data sources that can have a bearing on a particular
communications policy issue. In addition, each data source was associated with the appropriate
category(ies) of stakeholder group(s) – FCC, industry, academic, or public interest organization –

do reveal protected information, shall be used and treated by the Reviewing Party in the same fashion as the
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depending upon which of these stakeholder groups utilized the data source. The results of this analysis
are presented in Table 1.
_____________________
Insert Table 1 About Here
_____________________
As Table 1 illustrates, 40 different commercial data sources were utilized in the analyses that
contributed to the FCC’s media ownership decision. These sources ranged from large scale databases
(such as BIA and Nielsen data), to annual industry directories (such as the Broadcasting & Cable
Yearbook), to a wide array of industry financial reports (such as those provided by Kagan Research on the
cable industry). The FCC Media Ownership Working Group’s Study #1, A Comparison of Media Outlets
and Ownership for Tel Selected Markets, 1960, 1980, 2000, alone utilized six different commercial data
sources, including the BIA Master Access Pro database, along with five different commercially published
directories of television, cable, and print outlet information.115 Note that these results likely underrepresent the range of commercial data sources used in relation to this policy issue, as only those sources
that were cited directly by the FCC in the Report and Order, or that were part of studies cited directly in
the Report and Orderwere included in the analysis. Data sources utilized in any studies submitted to – but
not referenced by – the FCC would not be reflected in Table 1.
Of perhaps equal interest is the information contained on the right side of the table, which
identifies which stakeholders in the process utilized the data. As the table indicates, by far the most
common users of the relevant commercial data sources were the FCC and industry stakeholders (utilizing
24 and 23, respectively, of the 40 data sources listed in the Table1). As was noted previously, the extent
to which the Commission engaged in its own research in conjunction with this proceeding was somewhat
uncharacteristic, which may account for the impressively wide array of data sources the agency itself
drew upon in connection with this proceeding. Much less common was data usage by either public
115
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interest organizations or academic researchers, with cited public interest filers utilizing four different
commercial data sources and academic researchers utilizing seven. As this combination of results thus
indicates, not only did a wide array of commercial data sources figure very prominently in the analyses
relevant to the media ownership decision, but utilization of these data sources appears to have been very
unequally distributed across the various stakeholder groups, with the public interest and scholarly
research communities exhibiting far less usage of these sources. The imbalance exhibited in these
findings may simply be a result of the FCC more frequently citing the comments of industry stakeholders
than the work of academic or public interest researchers, though the literature on the role of research in
the policymaking process discussed previously would suggest that such a tendency would itself be a
function of policymakers’ preference for relying upon the submissions of stakeholders who engage in
empirical analysis.116
The Need for Improved Access to Commercial Data Sources for Policy Researchers
The extent of the commercialization of policy-relevant data contributes to an analytical imbalance
that strikes at the core of the functioning of a representative democracy and the role of information in the
democratic process. There are a wide range of benefits that arise from a policymaking environment in
which access to the relevant data is widely distributed. Arzberger, et al. provide perhaps one of the most
thorough catalogs of the social and economic benefits of expandsive data access for researchers:
Open access to, and sharing of, data reinforces open scientific inquiry, encourages diversity of
analysis and opinion, promotes new research, makes possible the testing of new or alternative
hypotheses and methods of analysis, supports studies on data collection methods and
measurement, facilitates the education of new researchers, enables the exploration of topics not
envisioned by the initial investigators, and permits the creation of new data sets when data from
multiple sources are combined.117
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As Nobel Laureate Joshua Ledberg has argued, “Data are the building blocks of knowledge and the seeds
of discovery. . . . They are also the foundation of sensible public policy in our democracy.”118
Consequently, the greater the diversity of sources of analysis that have the ability to meaningfully
participate in the policymaking process, the greater the likelihood that the information that ultimately
guides, and is utilized by, decision-makers will reflect the full range of policy options, considerations, and
concerns. Ultimately, as the National Research Council has noted, “The benefits of providing wider
access to microdata for researchers and policy analysts are better informed public policies.”119
Conversely, there are substantial dangers associated with a policy environment in which access to
the data that fuels policy analysis and guides policy decision-making is limited. Specifically, legitimate
concerns regarding public confidence in its policymakers arise from any policymaking process that relies
upon data and analysis that can not be subjected fully to public scrutiny and reassessment. Thus, “Public
access to data ensures greater transparency, which lends legitimacy to the regulatory process.
Transparency is a valuable aspect of public decision-making in a democracy.”120 To the extent that the
privatization of data undermines this transparency, public confidence in its policy decision-makers
suffers. Feld addresses this issue within the specific context of communications policymaking, noting
that “no one has a monopoly on wisdom. Scholars and advocates have a right and responsibility to verify
the FCC’s research – an impossibility if the FCC cannot release the underlying data.”121
In the end, from a purely normative perspective, it seems fairly clear that in a well-functioning
democracy public policy should be made with publicly available data. For there to be increasingly
privileged and unequal access to the raw data that guide policy decisions represents a significant failing in
the construction of our policymaking process and, consequently, a significant roadblock to effective
public policymaking and public confidence in policy decisions.
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Recommendations
In light of the multi-faceted problem outlined up to this point, this section develops a set of
possible paths for improving access to data that are used in communications policymaking and policy
analysis. It is worth noting that, to this point, to the extent that policies have addressed issues of access to
data used in policymaking, they have focused on data gathered with public funds,122 on the quality of
research conducted with publicly funded data,123 or, on the issue of privacy and confidentiality concerns
associated with the dissemination of data gathered from individual citizens.124 Yet, as this paper has
demonstrated, private data are perhaps more central to contemporary communications policymaking
today than are public data, yet little, if anything, has been done to address the access imbalances created
by this situation and their implications for policymaking.
Ideally, of course, a reversal of the trends toward greater privatization of data and reduced
government involvement in the data gathering process would be the most direct solution to the
information asymmetry that currently affects mmunications policymaking. Legislation requiring that the
Federal Communications Commission actively engage in a specific set of data gathering activities,
mandating that all such data be made available to the public in a timely and user-friendly fashion, and
providing the necessary increase in the Commission’s budget so that it could adequately engage in these
activities, would significantly address the problems outlined in this paper. Or, perhaps a separate
government agency devoted specifically to data gathering related to communications and information
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policy could be developed,125 or such responsibilities placed within the purview of another existing
government entity such as the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (which
already conducts some significant data gathering).
Such an approach would be particularly desirable in that it would allow for a better tailoring of
the data being gathered to the nature of the policy issues generally requiring attention. This would stand
in stark contrast to the contemporary situation, in which data gathered to serve entirely different needs
(i.e., the needs of communications firms, investors, and advertisers) are essentially “repurposed”126 to
address policy questions. As Hesmondhalgh and Pratt have noted, although cultural industries (such as
media and communications) produce substantial amounts of data to facilitate their operations, there
remains a concern with the “fitness for purpose,” of such data for research purposes, as “Such data are
functional for market making; but not for an understanding that will provide an evidence base for policy
making or intellectual inquiry.”127
As a reflection of this perspective, we can consider something as simple as the fact that, today,
the FCC assesses the media system along geographical parameters established and measured by
commercial audience measurement firms.128 Thus, media markets as defined by Nielsen and Arbitron
become the FCC’s units of analysis. There are, of course, many reasons why adhering to the market
parameters utilized within the regulated industries is useful – particularly in relation to economic policy
125

See Richard A. Peterson, The Role of Research in Developing Cultural Policy. 13 J. ARTS MGT. & LAW 190,
191-192 (1983), for a similar proposal – but one that focuses on cultural policy, (proposing an agency to facilitate
academic and private-sector research on cultural policy issues via the establishment of a data archive and the regular
collection of information at both the national and local levels. This agency would serve only a data-gathering
function, as opposed to being involved in analysis or policymaking.).
126
Repurposing refers to the practice in which content/information produced for one market is later re-used or resold
in additional markets. Repurposing takes advantage of the public good nature of media/information products in that
content is sold multiple times without additional production costs being incurred. See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE,
BEING DIGITAL 63 (1995) (“Repurposing goes hand in hand with the birth of any new medium. Film reused plays,
radio resold performances, and TV recycled movies”).
127
David Hesmondhalgh and Andy C. Pratt, Cultural Industries and Cultural Policy. 11 INT’L J. CULTURAL POLICY
10 (2005).
128
Federal Communications Commission, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620 (2003) par. 274: The Commission notes, “we will rely on the Arbitron
Metro Survey Area [Arbitron Metro] as the presumptive market.” In addition, in par. 280, the Commission notes that
it “traditionally has relied on BIA’s Media Access Pro database to obtain information about particular Arbitron
Metros.” See also David M. Hunsaker: Duopoly Wars: Analysis and Case Studies of the FCC’s Radio Contour
Overlap Rules, 2 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 21 (1994).

30
questions involving market competition. However, when we think more broadly about the mandate for
communications policymaking – particularly in relation to the role of our media system in the democratic
process – the fact that no systematic data are gathered that organize media outlets along political
jurisdictions is quite unfortunate.129
The importance of such an approach is illustrated by the fact that some highly regarded
communications policy research in recent years that has examined the relationship between media
sources, media content, and citizen engagement in the political process, was only able to be conducted
after the difficult and laborious process of roughly aligning political participation data (which are
gathered and reported according to political jurisdictions) with media source and content data that are
gathered and reported according to market definitions.130 To the extent that policymakers should concern
themselves with the political functions of the media outlets they regulate, it is surprising that neither they,
nor the broader research community, has access to systematic data that map our media system according
to local political parameters.
Along related lines, intensive usage and detailed scrutiny of the primary source of media market,
ownership, and financial data utilized by the FCC and many other stakeholders in the policymaking
process – the BIA Media Access Pro nation-wide database of television stations, radio stations, and
129
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newspapers – reveals that many minority-targeted and foreign-language newspapers are not included in
the database.131 Similarly, the standardized ratings reports generated by Arbitron for the radio industry
somewhat selectively report minority audience compositions for individual stations; limiting such
reporting only to those markets in which there is a substantial minority population.132 Regardless of the
reasons for these omissions (no doubt they are a reflection of the economics of database generation and a
reflection of the allocation of demand priorities of the primary users of the databases), the end result is an
inaccurate, incomplete portrait of the media system. The nature of omissions such as these undermines
analyses related to vital communications policy issues such as the diversity of information sources
available in media markets and the extent to which minority interests and concerns are being served at the
local level.133
These examples are meant to illustrate how data gathering freed of market imperatives could
potentially better serve communications policymaking and policy analysis. Certainly publicly-funded
data gathering brings with it its own set of potential pitfalls, but the purely commercially-driven data
infrastructure towards which we are migrating raises the possibility of increased disconnects between
policy questions and the information available to answer those questions – above and beyond the access
disparity issue which has been the focus of this paper.
Absent – or perhaps best, in addition to – progress on the governmental data gathering front,
efforts must also be made to enhance researchers’ access to relevant commercial data sources. In
pursuing such options, it seems reasonable to explore more effective mechanisms for balancing the needs
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of researchers and commercial database vendors in a manner that recognizes the substantial public interest
in policy research.134
One possible approach would involve the creation of a consortium of academic and public
interest policy researchers to collectively negotiate terms that could facilitate greater access to the relevant
data sources than is currently taking place. Such a proposal would no doubt require not only substantial
financial resources (be they from the academic/public interest organizations, or from external funders),
but also a commitment on the part of the commercial data providers to make their data available under
terms and conditions that meaningfully reflect how the broader public interest is served by such access. It
does seem safe to say that none of the commercial database providers whose products are used in the
communications policymaking process consider the policy research community the primary, secondary,
or even tertiary market for their products. If that were the case, these data products likely would not exist,
as the policy research community is far too small, and its resources far too limited, to meaningfully
support the creation of these data sets. To the extent, then, that the policy research community represents
a largely negligible part of the revenue stream for most commercial data providers, this may encourage
some flexibility in terms of how this community, when dealt with as a collective, is treated by the data
providers. Of course, such an access model would need to rigorously protect the existing revenue streams
of the commercial data providers and ensure that the access provided to the (relatively small) policy
research community did not create opportunities for other customer bases to gain access to the data. It
seems perfectly realistic that such a balance could be struck.
At the very least, such an initiative could work towards establishing greater formalization and
transparency in relation to the institutional rules and policies surrounding data access and usage. There
often is a very ad hoc nature to the processes of gaining access to the relevant data sources.135 Pricing
typically varies substantially in relation the resources of the potential purchaser, and in relation to how the
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data ultimately are to be used. Access terms can similarly vary from data provider to data provider, and
from client to client. These tendencies are, in many ways, inevitable byproducts of the business models
surrounding public goods, where the substantial opportunities to engage in price discrimination are
essential to the viability of public good production.136 Nonetheless, to the extent that some more
formalization and transparency in transactions can be developed for situations in which the primary use of
the data is for policy analysis, then improvement to the imbalances in data access that currently exist in
the policy analysis playing field could be achieved.
Also toward these ends, policy researchers should engage in a concerted effort to compile and
study the non-confidential components of model standard licensing agreements in an effort to establish a
broader understanding of standard access terms, to identify exemplary approaches, and to facilitate betterinformed negotiations in those instances when data access is being sought.137 This too could help
contribute to reducing the extremely ad hoc nature of how policy researchers typically engage with
commercial data providers.
A final possible mechanism for improving the current situation might be legislation that specifies
that once a data source is utilized in any study filed with a regulatory agency, the underlying data for that
research must be publicly available for reanalysis, regardless of whether the underlying data come from
public or private data sources. Whether the responsibility for negotiating contractual terms with the data
providers that allow for such access should reside with the government agency or the filing organization
is a question that would need to be answered. Or, perhaps such legislation could be directed specifically
at the data providers. Efforts in this vein reflect the notion that public policy should be made with
publicly available data and work toward evening the analytical playing field. However, one drawback of
136
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such a solution is that it is primarily reactive in its orientation, allowing only for broader access to data in
response to particular pieces of research. This, of course, places the less well resourced policy
researchers (e.g., scholars, public interest organizations) in a perpetual reactive, as opposed to pro-active,
position in the policy process, and thus may not sufficiently truly level the playing field. Another
potential drawback is a possible “chilling effect” on access to data, as data providers may completely
withhold their data from policy researchers of all types in lieu of having the data subsequently become
widely available to a broader user base.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that a confluence of circumstances: the growing centrality of empirical
research to public policymaking; the increased reliance of policymakers on externally-conducted
research; and the increased privatization of the key data utilized in policy analysis, all contribute to a
growing imbalance that can undermine effective and representative communications policymaking. This
paper has documented the centrality of commercial data sources to communications policymaking and
policy analysis and has presented arguments in favor of efforts to reduce the current imbalances in data
access that characterize the contemporary communications policymaking and policy analysis
environment. Finally, this paper has offered a series of suggestions for reducing this imbalance and
providing more equitable access to the data source that are central to communications policy research.
Future research should explore more extensively the legal issues surrounding access to commercial data
sources within policymaking contexts, particularly in terms of possible relationships to government in the
sunshine laws, the Administrative Procedures Act, copyright law, and fair use considerations.
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Table 1: Commercial Data Sources Used in Media Ownership Policy Analysis and Users
Data Source

Industry

FCC

Pub. Int.

Academic

x
x
x
x

x

x

x

Databases
BIA Media Access Pro
Bear Stearns
Adams Media Research
Arbitron Radio Market Reports
CNW Marketing Research Surveys
Duncan’s American Radio
Morgan Stanley
Newspaper Advertising Source
Nielsen Media Research
Nielsen Station Index
Nielsen Television Index
Viewers in Profile
Scarborough Research: Primenext Multimarket Data
Service Quality Analytics Data (SQAD)
Standard & Poor’s Compustat
Standard Rate & Data Service
UBS Warburg
Vickers Stock Research
VoiceTrak
Industry Directories
Ayer Directory of Publications
Broadcasting & Cable Yearbook
Burelle’s Media Directory
CBEMA Industry Marketing Data Book
Editor & Publisher International Yearbook
Television & Cable Factbook
Warren Cable & Station Coverage Atlas
Trade Publications/Reports
Cable Television Advertising Bureau: Cable TV Facts
Radio and Records Magazine
Kagan Research
Broadband Cable Financial Databook
Cable Operator Revenues
Cable TV Financial Databook
Cable TV Investor
Economics of Basic Cable Networks
Economics of TV Programming
Media Index
State of DBS
Media Dynamics TV Dimensions
Myers Reports
National Association of Broadcasters TV Financial Report
Nielsen Media Research Report on Television
Veronis Suhler Stevenson Communications Industry Forecast

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
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